

My Good Friend, the Humble House to House Vaccinator

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SUMMARY

The corresponding author served with the WHO between March 2011 and July 2013 in polio eradication as an Acute Flaccid Paralysis (AFP) Surveillance Medical Officer (SMO) in Supaul district of Bihar state of India. Going by experience and official data, this part of India is among the most impoverished areas in the world. The public healthcare system is rudimentary and grossly inadequate. The polio eradication program is one of the few bright spots in terms of operational efficiency. The challenges to mass immunisation included poor infrastructure (in terms of roads, electricity, and trained manpower), widespread illiteracy, superstition, chronic poverty, malnutrition and extremes of weather. Supaul, with a population of 2.2 million, had about 1800 vaccinators in approximately 900 two-woman teams. The money that was paid to them was officially dubbed an honorarium, which might seem to imply that the recipient was never in any real need of it. But that was obviously not the case. A vexing issue that was faced all through was that of delayed payments to vaccinators and supervisors, which had a negative impact on the morale of the vaccinators and their supervisors. Arriving at trainings to purvey dismal attendance and disappointed faces was a most unpleasant task for the corresponding author. India was certified polio free by the WHO in January 2014. A good part of the credit for that goes to our very good friend, the humble vaccinator, the single most valuable human asset in the entire Global Polio Eradication Initiative. We salute her indomitable spirit.

FULL CONTRIBUTION

The corresponding author served with the WHO in polio eradication as an Acute Flaccid Paralysis (AFP) Surveillance Medical Officer (SMO) in Supaul district of Bihar state of India. Going by experience and official data, this part of India is among the most impoverished areas in the world. The public healthcare system is rudimentary and grossly inadequate. The polio eradication program is one of the few bright spots in terms of operational efficiency. The challenges to mass immunisation included poor infrastructure (in terms of roads, electricity, and trained manpower), widespread illiteracy, superstition, chronic poverty, malnutrition and extremes of weather.

The entire polio eradication initiative in India is operationalised through more than 2 million vaccinators who go from house to house, vaccinating children with 2 drops of the vaccine in each polio "round". Supaul district, with a population of 2.2 million, had about 1800 vaccinators in approximately 900 two-woman teams. Every 3 teams had 1 supervisor. Each team would have to visit 80 to 120 houses in the morning, and then visit them in the

afternoon again to vaccinate those children under 5 years of age who would have been missed in the morning. Every "round" would last 6 days.

Most vaccinators were poorly paid community health workers. The rest were volunteers who were roped in for areas that didn't have community health workers or for access-compromised areas where they would need to wade through waist deep water, or walk across deserts that did not have roads and were hence unmotorable. The money that was paid to them was officially dubbed an honorarium, which might seem to imply that the recipient was never in any real need of it. But that was obviously not the case. The amount was INR 75 (PKR 122) per day. This was half of minimum wages in Bihar. 6 days of vaccination work brought them INR 450 (PKR 732). As a comparison, the S.M.O. who trained them was paid INR 4000 (PKR 6514) a day. Or 53 times as much.

The WHO SMO office had a mandate to assist the government technically and operationally on 2 aspects of polio eradication: AFP surveillance and immunisation. Lack of popular demand for a robust healthcare system and the consequent lack of political will to establish the same meant that the WHO office was left to partner with an acutely understaffed skeletal public healthcare infrastructure. Therefore, the SMO office had to take significant ownership of what was supposed to be a predominantly government owned

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program. A vexing issue that was faced all through was that of delayed payments to vaccinators and supervisors, which had a negative impact on the morale of the vaccinators and their supervisors. The payments were said to be delayed because something called a Statement of Expenditure (SOE) had not been submitted either by the Primary Health Centres to the District Headquarters (DQ), or by DQ to State Headquarters. Either that or some other mode of bureaucratic bungling. Nobody in government seemed to take the initiative to solve this vexing issue. The SMO office had no jurisdiction in the matter since all payments to vaccinators and supervisors were with government funds through government agencies. The delay in payments, sometimes running into more than 2 months, caused a drop in attendance at vaccinator trainings, especially when vaccination activity was scheduled in consecutive months, which was very often the case in Bihar which had 8 to 10 rounds every year at the time the corresponding author was there. Vaccinator attendance data was analysed by the SMO's superiors in WHO, not by anyone in government, and instructions to conduct catch-up

trainings were issued to the SMO office, not to the district government health office. What this meant was, that though the SMO office had no jurisdiction in the matter of payments to volunteers in a government program, it had the responsibility of ensuring that all of them turned up for training. This was responsibility without authority, violating one of Henri Fayol's fourteen principles of management. It seemed like the cycle of delayed payments, falling attendance of vaccinators at trainings, the conduct of catch up trainings and giving shaky assurances to vaccinators that the money would be released soon had become *de rigueur*.

Arriving at trainings to purvey dismal attendance and disappointed faces was a most unpleasant task for the corresponding author. There would most certainly have been many more surveillance medical officers and vaccinators in other districts who would have gone through similar emotions. India was certified polio free by the WHO in January 2014. A good part of the credit for that goes to our very good friend, the humble vaccinator, the single most valuable human asset in the entire Global Polio Eradication Initiative. We salute her indomitable spirit.